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The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World
Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China

After the Northwest Passage is opened up it will become a new
“axial sea route between Atlantic and Pacific,” and the sea route
between Europe, Asia, and North America will be shortened by
5,200 to 7,000 nautical miles. Whoever controls the Arctic sea
route will control the world economy and a new internationally
strategic corridor.
LI ZHENFU

T

he Chinese are increasingly interested in the effects of global climate change and
the melting of the Arctic ice cap, especially as they pertain to emergent sea routes,
natural resources, and geopolitical advantage.1 China seems to see the overall effect of
Arctic climate change as more of a beckoning economic opportunity than a looming
environmental crisis. Even though it is not an Arctic country, China wants to be among
the first states to exploit the region’s natural resource wealth and to ply ships through its
sea routes, especially the Northwest Passage.
The Arctic is currently quite topical in China, and articles on China’s newfound interest
in Arctic affairs now appear with some frequency in major academic journals, as well as
in the popular media. There is currently something of a cacophony of Chinese voices on
Arctic affairs, and this is because Chinese Arctic policy has not been fully formulated or
promulgated.2 There does, however, seem to be a current consensus within Arctic policy
debate, discussion, and deliberation in China, and that is that the Arctic belongs to all
humankind and not to any one country or group of countries. But herein is a quandary
for China, which has a long and assertive record of insisting on sovereign state rights as
the paramount principle of international relations. As the Finnish scholar Linda Jakobson of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has trenchantly pointed out,
China’s insistence that respect for state sovereignty be a guiding principle of international
relations makes it difficult for China to question the Arctic states’ sovereignty [and sovereign] rights [and jurisdiction]. There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials
calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of mankind so that all states can share
in the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China’s long-standing principles
of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other states.3
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Even though China is currently climbing the Arctic learning curve, it seems reluctant to
acknowledge that it being a non-Arctic country, its influence in the Arctic and in Arctic
affairs might be somewhat limited. This hesitance arises, however, not from pride or
haughtiness but from concern over the multivalent implications of such an acknowledgement: China does not want to lose any ground in its campaign to become a major
player in the world in general, and increasingly for Beijing that means being a player in
the Arctic. China wants, as the term in Chinese goes, to “insert its hands” (chashou) into
Arctic affairs but finds it inconvenient to indicate this directly, because that would be
infelicitous diplomatically. So instead, China engages in unctuous and circumlocutory
diplomatic language about respecting the sovereignty of Arctic countries, hoping that
the Arctic countries can resolve their differences quickly and anticipating that Arctic
issues can ultimately be worked out through negotiation to the satisfaction of both the
Arctic and international communities. But the gentlemanly bows and matronly curtsies
and bouquets of Chinese diplomatic gesturing should not be confused for acquiescence
or lack of resolve on China’s part. Despite its status as a non-Arctic country, China seems
bound and determined to have a voice, perhaps even a say-so, in Arctic affairs.
China today is quite aware of the U.S. Geological Survey’s estimates that “25% of the
world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon resources are found there, along with 9% of the
world’s coal and other economically critical minerals.”4 Whether or not it will own up
to it in so many words, China nurses an enormous sense of entitlement to the natural
resource wealth of the Arctic, because it is a major emerging world power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This was expressed by Chinese
rear admiral Yin Zhuo in March 2010: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the
world, as no nation has sovereignty over it. . . . China must plan an indispensable role in
Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”5
The Chinese nightmare scenario for the Arctic is that the European and North American
Arctic powers will more or less gang up and “carve up the Arctic melon” and its natural resources among themselves, to the exclusion of everyone else. At least one Chinese
academic has raised alarmist concerns about Russia’s dropping of a titanium capsule
containing a Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in late 2007, about Russia’s
“dream of extending its continental shelf,” and about its putative suggestion of an alliance among the eight Arctic states, known as the A8:*
Things that happen in the Arctic and Antarctic involve China’s rights and interests. During
this process we should guard against some individual states casting China aside and privately consulting [among themselves] about establishing a regional multilateral treaty system, thereby harming China’s polar rights and interests. This concern is not unreasonable
* The “A8” are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The
“A5,” mentioned below, are the five Arctic littoral states: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia,
and the United States.
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because Russian scholars have been clamoring for the establishment of an “Eight-State
Polar Region Alliance” [Jidi baguo lianmeng].6

The use of the term “Eight-State Polar Region Alliance” here for a possible alliance
among the A8 states is highly charged, emotively, because it directly echoes the infamous
military conduct of the “Eight-State Allied Forces” (Baguo Lianjun) that entered and
sacked Beijing in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion in the late summer and autumn
of 1900.7 For many Chinese such a multilateral treaty system among Arctic powers to the
exclusion of China would be, at the intuitive and visceral level, somewhat reminiscent of
the imperialist deprivation and bullying China suffered during its century of humiliation, from the mid-nineteenth through mid-twentieth centuries.
This study considers at some length the discussions and debates on Arctic issues, mainly
in Chinese-language scholarly journals but also in journalistic and diplomatic Chineselanguage discussion. This study is neither an overview of international Arctic issues and
disputes nor a speculative piece on China’s geopolitical and strategic intentions in the
Arctic. It is also not an introduction to China’s recent interest in Arctic affairs, which was
the topic of Linda Jakobson’s fine and pioneering article published in early 2010.8 It is,
rather, a report on China’s sometimes-contentious debates and discussions of the issue,
an account that hopes to convey something of their extent, complexity, and flavor while
China works out its Arctic policy and prepares for its future position in and regarding
the Arctic. It also offers some foreign policy recommendations for the United States.
In these Chinese debates and exchanges there is not much direct or substantive consideration of the Arctic interests and policies of the United States. The reasons for this
seem to defy simple analysis. It is unlikely that China would refrain from extensive
commentary on Arctic issues simply to avoid worsening any further the already-frayed
Sino-American relationship. It could well be that China actually does not see much with
which to disagree in American Arctic policy, at least as presently constituted; the two
states have common interests in the Arctic, not the least of which is freedom of navigation through it. At the policy level, the United States is not seeking to challenge China
in the Arctic. Further, while it is unlikely that China declines to take the United States
seriously as an Arctic power, China does seem to see Russia and especially Canada as the
principals in current Arctic issues; certainly the United States does not assert the claims
to sovereignty over Arctic sea routes that Canada does. Finally, it may also well be that
the continuing failure of the United States to accede to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is, to some extent, muffling Washington’s voice in
international forums on maritime issues in the Arctic and other regions.
Linda Jakobson speculates that “the notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be
expected to be repeated in articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese
officials until it gradually begins to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs.”9 There
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is, however, disagreement in China over exactly what these rights are or ought to be.
China’s scholarly discourse on its Arctic interests is not monolithic or uniformly teleological. While the interrelationships in China of cause and effect between academic and
public discourse on the one hand and the formulation of state policy on the other are
usually only translucent, if not opaque, to outsiders, the presence and apparent toleration of debate and disparity about Arctic affairs does suggest that scholarly publication is
not always an echo chamber for CPC (Communist Party of China) policy diktat. There
is genuine debate in China, at least for the present, about some aspects of Arctic policy.

Conflict in or over the Arctic?
It seems almost obligatory in Chinese articles on the nation’s interests in the Arctic to
include the introductory observation that the Arctic, hitherto almost universally seen
as bleak, frigid, and forbidding, is now regarded with the covetous eyes and glowering
visages of major powers who long to control access to its waters, militarize its islands,
and secure legal rights to its wealth in oil, natural gas, minerals, and seafood. A prime
example is an article published in 2010 in the prestigious Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan xuebao
(Journal of the University of International Relations) by Xu Zhenwei (of Nankai University’s Zhou Enlai School of Government and Management in Tianjin) and Xu Yuanyuan
(of Qingdao University’s School of Economics in Qingdao, Shandong Province). It
points out (perhaps unwittingly) that China covets the same Arctic assets that the
United States, Canada, and Russia do: “What, after all, is so alluring about the ice-in-thesky, snow-on-the-earth Arctic that it makes the three great and powerful countries the
U.S., Canada, and Russia contentious to the point that they don’t know what to do? After
reading through many materials we have discovered [the reasons]: resources, sea routes,
and strategic significance. These three resplendent jewels attract covetous stares from the
three great and powerful countries.”10
That the Arctic might emerge in the future as the theater for regional and perhaps even
global conflict is a possibility entertained with some seriousness in China today. An
article published in 2010 in the influential popular magazine Dangdai haijun (Modern
Navy) notes that the United States is currently procuring more warm clothing for naval
personnel and is, in accordance with the U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap, preparing for the
construction and deployment of an Arctic surface fleet, a project slated for the years
2011 through 2015.11 A senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army noted in 2008
that use of force in the Arctic over issues of sovereignty could not be ruled out.12 In an
article published in 2009, Li Zhenfu, associate professor in the College of Transportation
Management at Dalian Maritime University in Dalian, Liaoning Province, argues that
the ultimate resolution of Arctic issues will have direct bearing on world security.13
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During the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union believed that whoever
owned the Arctic would control the world, asserts a brief recent article in the popular
fortnightly magazine Dongbei zhi chuang (Window on the Northeast). The article quotes
a recent prediction in the Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda (the Communist Youth
League version of Pravda, still in publication today and the top-selling newspaper in
Russia) about the likelihood of World War III breaking out in the Arctic:
The dispute over the Arctic is strategic in nature for all Arctic countries. For Russia, the
United States, and Canada, what used to be seen as a natural barrier in their backyards
has suddenly become a wide open, bustling artery, one for which the legal boundaries are
vague and the characteristics unclear. This presents major issues for the present and future
wealth and security of these countries. This remote and silent realm of frozen seas and
snow-capped peaks has suddenly become “hot.” The Arctic Council is no longer a polite
and genteel academic forum for geography, meteorology, and scientific research.
With the continual discoveries of new resources beneath the Arctic Ocean, this previously
neglected land of snow and ice has become a treasure house at which each country gazes
with the cruel greed of a tiger. Although the land areas of the Arctic are owned by the eight
countries Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and
Russia, the strife over Arctic sovereignty has not only not subsided, but has become more
vehement over time. Russia’s Komsomolskaya Pravda even predicts that “because there are
serious discrepancies over the division and delimitation of Arctic interests, the World War
III of the future may well break out in the Arctic.”14

Russia—disparagingly called the “big northern lunk” in 2010 by Chinese academics
Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen, of the School of Law and Political Science at the Ocean
University of China in Qingdao—has taken note of China’s new and aggressive pursuit
of Arctic interests.15 “Russia will increase naval patrols in the Arctic Ocean to defend
its interests against nations such as China seeking a share of the area’s mineral wealth,”
Reuters quoted Russian Navy commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky as saying on 4
October 2010 in an interview with Itar-Tass. “We are observing the penetration of a host
of states which . . . are advancing their interests very intensively, in every possible way,
in particular China,” Vysotsky continued, adding that Russia would “not give up a single
inch” in the Arctic.16 The next day, however, perhaps in an attempt to provide a counterweight to Admiral Vysotsky’s comments, Russia Today reported an authoritative opinion
that Arctic issues between the two states were not likely lead to conflict:
Evgeny Bazhankov, Vice Chancellor of Research and International Relations at the Russian
Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy, believes there is not much for Russia to worry
about in relation to China’s growing role in the region. Like many other countries, it does
pursue its economic interests in the region, which is sprawling with natural resources.
However, he told RT, it is unlikely that Moscow and Beijing would ever clash over the
area. The analyst underlined that the two states are “strategic partners” whose positions on
many international issues, including at the UN, are the same. Therefore, Russia and China
would certainly be able to come to an agreement on the Arctic zone question as well.17
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Popular glossy military magazines in China often beat the war drums about the likelihood of conflict breaking out in the Arctic. An article in the November 2010 issue of
Dangdai haijun is a typical example:
According to the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” currently in effect,
the Arctic does not belong to any country. In addition to the five circum-Arctic countries
Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, many [other] countries have
proclaimed partial sovereignty over the Arctic. At present there is no Arctic country which
has clearly proven that its continental shelf extends into the Arctic, and because of this the
Arctic is regarded as an “international area” and is supervised and managed by the International Seabed Authority. Some countries are contending for Arctic sovereignty, and this
is tantamount to infringing upon the interests of the other countries of the world. In facing
this real and quite unpredictable “scramble and battle for the Arctic” and the probability of
some countries dividing up the [Arctic] melon with the aid of geographical advantage and
military might, if peaceful means cannot produce the anticipated effects, war becomes the
only method for resolving the issue. Based on this, it is not difficult for us to imagine that
the probability of the future outbreak of war in the Arctic is very high, and that as soon as
war breaks out, the United States, Russia, and Canada will be its main principals.18

In Canada, more benign and rational assessments of potential trouble in the Arctic
usually (but not always) prevail; there may be tension and friction in the Arctic in the
future, but by and large Canadian commentators on Arctic affairs do not usually see
conflict as a distinct possibility. The conclusions of Kyle D. Christensen of Canada’s
National Defence Headquarters are typical: “There exists in China a distinct group of
academics and officials trying to influence leaders to adopt a much more assertive stance
in the Arctic than has traditionally been the case. This could ultimately bring China into
disagreement with circumpolar states in a variety of issue areas, and alter security and
sovereignty relationships in the circumpolar region.”19

Chinese Scholarly Writing on Arctic Issues
The Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue xuebao (Journal of the Ocean University of China), of the
Ocean University of China, has been a prominent outlet for discussion of China’s Arctic
interests and has recently published a spate of important articles on the subject.20 Most
of the principals in these discussions and debates are academics, but popular media in
China and the Chinese government itself are also beginning to comment more on Arctic
affairs.
Not all is monolithic or dogmatic in China’s discussion and dissension on Arctic affairs,
however; there is in fact a fairly wide range of opinions and perspectives. For instance,
scholarly articles in Chinese typically discuss China’s interests in the Arctic, but there
seems to be no unanimity of opinion as to exactly what all of these interests are. There
seems to be something of a consensus in academic articles that China should strive for
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and preserve its “right to speak up” (huayu quan) about Arctic affairs, but even this is
disputed, as by two scholars in an important article published in a major journal in
2010: “We have no way to participate fully, or even participate at all, in Arctic affairs. We
especially have no right to speak up on the dispute about authority over the territorial
waters of the Arctic Archipelago.”21
Nonetheless, the preponderance of scholarly discussion clearly favors the idea that China
deserves some voice in Arctic affairs and that the sea routes and natural resources of the
Arctic should be open to the entire world. The mantra that the Arctic and its natural
resource wealth belong to no one country or group of countries but constitute the common heritage of all humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commentary on Arctic affairs. There are also indications that China sees itself at the vanguard of
the rest of humanity and the international community in this regard.
A Chinese admiral said in early 2010 that since China has 20 percent of the world’s
population, it should have 20 percent of the Arctic’s resources.22 While this attempt at
moral reasoning does not likely amount to officially announced Chinese policy, it does
reflect China’s sense of moral entitlement to access to Arctic sea routes and its anxiety
that Arctic states might somehow endeavor to block or restrict this access.
The Chinese do, by and large, recognize Arctic issues mainly as regional ones, but they
seek to emphasize and enlarge their international dimensions, especially as they pertain
to natural resources and sea routes. The operative assumption seems to be that increased
internationalization of Arctic affairs will work more to China’s advantage than does the
current dispensation. Among prescient Chinese who write on Arctic affairs, however,
there is concern that the nation might not be up to the task of projecting and promoting
its Arctic interests in the international arena, since global mechanisms are founded largely upon Western concepts and ideologies with which China is not especially familiar.
One author in particular, Li Zhenfu, urges his fellow Chinese to familiarize themselves
with those Western theories and mechanisms to lessen purely moral and ethical reasoning pertaining to China’s rights and interests in the Arctic.
By 2009 China’s present and future interests in the Arctic were creating enough buzz to
induce a major journal dedicated to maritime affairs to jump into the fray. In the third
issue of the 2009 volume of the Journal of the Ocean University of China (Social Sciences
Edition), published by the Ocean University, the editors announced that with that issue
they would be starting a “column” for research on polar region issues:
The unique geographical locations and natural environments of the polar regions have
determined their important positions in scientific research and international political law,
and they have become the foci for research in many branches of learning. At present the
polar regions are undergoing rapid atmospheric, land, oceanic, ecological, and social transformations which will produce weighty influences on global climate and socioeconomic
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development. Global environmental and political changes will have deep influence on
the national rights and interests of every country, including China. The worth of polar
region resources, scientific research, and environment have weighty significance for the
future development of humankind, and especially the quantitative enormity of [the polar
regions’] mineral and biological resources have in recent years elicited strong world attention. Against the background of environmental transformation in the polar regions,
in addition to strengthening natural science research in the polar regions, humanities and
social science research on the polar regions with politics and law at the core is of great urgency. “Preparedness ensures success, while unpreparedness spells failure.” Only with the
development of forward-looking, in-depth research can [China] possess the right to speak
up about future international affairs pertaining to the polar regions. To this end, with this
issue this periodical is starting the “polar region issues” column, and it will continually
present the newest results of research by our country’s scholars into humanities and social
science aspects of the polar regions. At the same time, we welcome scholars inside and
outside China involved in polar region research to submit manuscripts. [Let us] together
create flourishing prospects for research on the polar regions.23

A Uniquely Chinese Approach
Li Zhenfu is easily among the most emphatic of Chinese commentators on Arctic issues.
He has published several important articles on China’s interests in the Arctic issue and
has actively applied rigorous social-science methodology to the topic. He has obviously had extensive exposure to Western geopolitical and social-science theory, and on
occasion he sums up contentions and analyses with extensive summation equations
that would be comprehensible only to the most positivistic of social scientists, as in two
virtually identical articles published in 2009 involving SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis of the Arctic issue from China’s perspective.24
But for all its theoretical content, Li’s writing can seem vague and nonspecific. It frequently mentions China’s “rights and interests” in the Arctic but never quite gets around
to defining or spelling them out. His articles clearly assume and argue that increased
theoretical sophistication will help guarantee Chinese interests in the Arctic, but they
do not specify how or why. They recommend injecting elements of traditional Chinese
culture to produce a uniquely Chinese approach to Arctic geopolitical affairs but give no
concrete specifics.
One basic position seems to inform Li’s many articles: China wants and deserves a piece
of the Arctic action even though it is not and never has been an Arctic state. It seems
that for Li, China’s right of access to the Arctic is so self-evident and axiomatic as to
require no elaboration or justification. He has yet to bring forth an effective argument
in favor of China’s accelerated intervention in Arctic affairs that is not based squarely
and unabashedly on China’s self-interest. He apparently regards issues of geographical
propinquity and historical jurisdiction as largely irrelevant.
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For Li Zhenfu, it seems, scientific expeditions and exploration are handmaidens to
larger, nonscientific purposes. That is, Chinese scientific activity in the Arctic is clearly
subservient and tributary to the nation’s geopolitical considerations and regional strategic posturing. At one point, while discussing Chinese scientific investigations and polar
explorations, Li even speaks of “the possibility of our country’s open declarations of
sovereignty over the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, as well as territorial claims.”25
Arctic Environmental Issues
Very few Chinese articles on the nonscientific implications of Arctic affairs seem to
discuss prevention or reversal of climate change. The phenomenon is fatalistically accepted as an accomplished fact and future trend; the only questions pertain to dealing
with the changes, challenges, and opportunities it brings and formulating political,
economic, diplomatic, and other non–hard science responses to it. Further, a consensus
is evident that as far as the Arctic environment is concerned, existing environmental law
is adequate for now and in the future might serve as the basis of more comprehensive
international precedent, if not a full international treaty.
The 2009 article that started the series on Arctic issues in the Journal of the Ocean University of China, “Research on the Issue of Arctic Environmental Law from the Point of
View of International Law,” by Liu Huirong and Yang Fan of Ocean University’s School
of Law and Political Science, is from start to finish an examination of environmental and
legal issues pertaining to the Arctic.26 It contains no substantial discussion of specifically
Chinese interests in the Arctic and does not regard or treat Arctic environmental issues
as representing a legal or diplomatic back door through which China could enter the
Arctic and then throw its weight around geopolitically.
Liu and Yang bemoan the present lack of a comprehensive international Arctic treaty,
and consider extensively the reasons for the “fragmentation of international law” as it
pertains to the Arctic environment. They also discuss at some length the contradictions
among various treaties and instruments of environmental law, as well as between national and international law. They then give suggestions for resolving these conflicts.27 In
their conclusion they express optimism about UNCLOS as the best means for balancing
international interests, characterizing the U.S. refusal to accede to the convention as an
American liability:
Looking far and wide at the legal documents which can resolve disputes related to the
Arctic and how each state implements them, [it is our opinion that] UNCLOS is the most
effective path for balancing the rights and interests among each of the signatory Arctic
states. In the present disputes, with the exception of the United States, all other countries
have already ratified UNCLOS. As a nonsignatory state to UNCLOS, in the midst of the
disputes over resources which are growing fiercer by the day, the United States is meeting up with risks and hazards [regarding access to] the rich resources of several thousand
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square kilometers of continental shelf. The position of the U.S. as a nonsignatory state in
reality impedes its protection of its maritime interests. To protect their rights and interests
in the Arctic region, every state has started paying serious attention to UNCLOS and hopes
to find in it the legal basis for supporting its positions, this in order to win advantageous
positions in international court decisions and obtain the recognition of international
society.
It is the authors’ opinion that [China] should proceed from the law of the sea, with
UNCLOS as basis, and originate principles of the law of the sea directed solely at the
Arctic. What is more, [China should] enable these principles to cover environmental protection, scientific research, resource development, and other realms. UNCLOS is already
widely applied in the Arctic, and the main content of some of its articles is directed at
environmental protection of ice-covered areas by littoral states. The main body of the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by the territory of sovereign states, and because of this Arctic
issues are essentially maritime issues. Although related countries all approve of UNCLOS
as a basis for the resolution of Arctic issues, each country proceeds with indiscriminate
interpretation of UNCLOS and other treaties in accordance with its own national rights
and interests. What is more, there exist “defects” in UNCLOS itself. We should proceed
with the development and improvement of its relevant systems, and we can especially go
forth from the special system for “ice-covered areas” in striving for the founding of a set
of new specialized systems, directed at Arctic circumstances, for the resolution of Arctic environmental issues. Further, as a part of the helter-skelter Arctic international law
system, UNCLOS still needs to resolve the issue of its conflict with other treaties. It can be
seen that conflicts between treaties pertaining to the Arctic are far from being solvable in a
day and a night.28

An article by Mei Hong in a subsequent 2009 number of Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue
xuebao, is primarily (but not entirely) about how environmental law pertaining to the
Arctic can lead to more comprehensive law. The piece especially covers sea routes, but
Mei does not neglect environmental issues and in fact seems genuinely concerned about
them. Arctic environmental concerns are not, for him, mere cynical ploys for achieving
geopolitical or economic advantage.
Mei observes that there are only two international treaties directly pertaining to the
Arctic: the 1920 Svalbard Treaty and UNCLOS, of 1982. These he finds quite insufficient
for the current disputes over Arctic sea route rights and interests. But Mei is a realist,
and he faces up to current reality: “It would be difficult in the short term to shape the
harmonized international will [necessary] for concluding a specialized treaty regarding all aspects of legal issues pertaining to Arctic sea routes. Moreover, I fear it would be
difficult for international legislation revolving around the Arctic sea routes to break free
of the already-existent system of international law principles and set up an entirely new
one.”29
Mei echoes the insight of Guo Peiqing (Ocean University) that in essence Arctic disputes
are maritime disputes. For Mei, the most extensive, albeit not comprehensive, body of
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international law pertaining to the Arctic is environmental law, and at the bottom of
international law is the international law of the sea (LOS). In fact, Mei sees LOS as the
potential “source of the law”:
For issues of maritime environmental protection relating to Arctic sea routes, it is not
difficult to find the source of the law from amid the international law and international
environmental protection principles over the last half a century or so. In view of this, this
article takes the framework of international law, of which the main body is LOS, and [with
it] investigates the revelations of related international law legal regulations toward Arctic
sea route legal rules and regulations.30

Mei traces the development of postwar international maritime environmental law in
some detail. He covers the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
(CLC 1969), the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL 1973), and the establishment and development of the “prevention
[precautionary?] principle” in international maritime environmental law.31 He notes that
“the Arctic region is a region that is extremely sensitive to environmental pollution, and
its population and culture are completely dependent on the ecological and environmental conditions of the region.”32 He ends his historical survey with two straightforward
and descriptive paragraphs on the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 but offers no significant
commentary on it.33
Mei’s concluding paragraphs sum up his combined commercial, geopolitical, and environmental concerns about the Arctic region and convey his optimistic (perhaps even
roseate) view of the future emergence of international law pertaining to the Arctic:
In a word, international legislation on maritime environmental protection has already established, from the prevention of pollution from ships and the prevention of waste dumping at sea, the basic system for combined maritime management. What is more, under the
guidance of the “prevention principle,” [the system] is continually being developed and
perfected.
Today, despite the variegated and complicated situation revolving around the disputes
of each country pertaining to Arctic sea route rights and interests, mutual convergences
of considerations regarding rights and interests also exist. Although enormous commercial rights and interests exist pertaining to the opening of Arctic sea routes, giving due
consideration to the protection of maritime environment and Arctic ecology is a common
understanding of each state. Protecting the maritime environment from harm and attaching importance to managing multiple ecological systems in opening and managing Arctic
sea routes are basic requirements for the opening and plying [of ships] along sea routes.
Protecting the maritime environment of Arctic sea routes and safeguarding the greatest common rights and interests of humankind—doing no harm to ecological rights and
interests, guarding against ecological hazards, and preventing and controlling ecological
damage—[these] are issues pertaining to the opening up and management of Arctic sea
routes that cannot be overlooked. Not only should the Arctic countries pay close attention
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to ecological protection in the Arctic, but [all of] international society should pass perfected or newly created regulations in international law to safeguard the ecological rights
and interests commonly enjoyed by all of humankind regarding the Arctic.
The scholar [Robert] Wade of the London School of Economics has said, in an article
entitled “Why a Warmer Arctic Needs New Laws” and published in England’s Financial
Times, that because of intensifying global warming, the Arctic Ocean will become the front
line of battles over economic rivalries.* Against this background, international society
must produce regulations pertaining to maritime environmental protection of Arctic sea
routes and ecological protection of the polar regions. Carrying on discussions concerning the environmental protection of Arctic sea routes and coming up with specialized
regulations are the significances which the further development of international maritime
environmental legislation should have. Of course, specialized regulations should build
upon the foundation of already existing international laws and regulations, turn relevant
rules in current international law into the origin of laws, and direct them at the uniqueness
of the Arctic ocean areas, all in order to come up with regulations in the manner of special
agreements.34

An article published in 2010 by Dong Yue and two other scholars at the School of Law
and Political Science considers the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) as a
“soft law” factor in Arctic environmental protection. After wrestling with definitions and
conceptualizations of soft law, the article considers AEPS along with AMAP (the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Program), EPPR (Energy Prevention, Preparedness, and
Response), PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment), and CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna). It argues that although there is widespread consensus
about AEPS in the international community and despite its current soft-law status as
the standard or norm for Arctic environmental protection, AEPS has drawbacks such as
practical limitations and lack of enforceability. This is ultimately a question of “what is”
and “what ought to be,” Dong and his coauthors contend:
Although we fully recognize the Arctic environmental management functions brought
into play by AEPS and the Arctic Council, we should also see that except for the aforesaid
functions, it brings very few other functions into play, especially toward member state legislation, judicature, and enforcement. Many work plans and research results remain at the
preliminary level, and there is no way for them to be transformed into concrete restrictive
directives. Further, the Arctic Council established by AEPS as the largest inter-governmental
agency has no policy-making authority, no organizational capabilities, no control over
resources, and no right to restrict member states. The Arctic Council also has no standing
as an international legal personality, and is only a high-level forum for “endeavoring to
promote cooperation pertaining to sustainable development, environmental protection,
and other common issues among Arctic states in the circum-Arctic region.” The position
of the Arctic Council is similar to that of “The Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe,” APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], or the Group of 77.35
* Mei Hong erroneously gives the affiliation as “London School of Political Economy” (Lundun Zhengzhi
Jingji Xueyuan) and the title as “A Warmer Arctic Needs Shipping Regulations.”—Trans.
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Nonetheless, AEPS and its related organizations and measures are still useful as transitions to hard international law pertaining to the Arctic, the authors conclude:
In summation of the above, it would be extremely difficult to conclude a uniform environmental treaty in the Arctic. AEPS is absolutely not the best choice for “what ought to be,”
but an inevitable choice of “what is” under the circumstances. From a certain level this explains the relationship of soft law to hard law: Under the new challenges international law
faces, there are many circumstances in which soft law is a transitional means to an end. But
there are also some circumstances under which soft law exists independently and [indeed]
must exist independently. Further, between [soft law] and hard law there exists a relationship of “is” and “ought to be,” of “practical choice” and “ideal prospects.”36

Watching the Chinese Watch the A5
After making the standard observation that the Arctic potentially contains 25 percent
of the world’s oil and natural gas, 9 percent of the world’s coal, and large amounts of
diamonds, gold, and uranium, Xu Zhenwei and Xu Yuanyuan use game theory and the
prisoner’s dilemma to explain why Russia, Canada, and the United States do not adopt
cooperative, simultaneous measures regarding the Arctic but instead opt for contentious stratagems and postures.37 They make extensive use of matrices in their analysis,
but at one point they briefly change their analytical metaphor from gaming to one of
staged performance: “On the scramble-for-Arctic-sovereignty stage the three states busy
themselves until they are dizzy: ‘After you’re through singing I’ll mount the stage.’ One
side adduces evidence and another side refutes it and brings up its own evidence, around
and around in circles. As yet no state has produced compelling evidence that persuades
the minds and mouths of the other two. What will be the results if they just keep going
on this way?”38
The two authors then work through more matrices and ultimately propose a solution:
cooperation and coordination. They conclude with a recommendation for noncircumpolar countries:
Noncircumpolar states should also be highly concerned with Arctic issues and not stand
idly by with hands in pockets. This is because Arctic issues have a bearing on the existence and development of all humankind. The international community should press the
circumpolar countries to talk things through peacefully, work out effective laws, expeditiously establish effective mechanisms for handling Arctic issues, and reasonably develop
and exploit Arctic resources so that all countries can, on a cooperative basis, be winners.39

Canada’s Arctic Claims
Although Canada joined UNCLOS, Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen assert in their
sprawling and discursive article on Canada and the Arctic, nobody has been able to stop
Canada from attempting to designate Arctic Ocean areas adjacent to the North American mainland as Canadian internal waters. The Canadians base their stance on two
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grounds, Mei and Wang observe: straight baselines and historical possession. They trace
the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ’s) straight-baseline concept to the Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v. Norway) of 1951 and criticize the straight-baseline concept as vague
and subjective. Nonetheless, they are convinced, Canada can always find a pretext for its
claims under the straight-baseline doctrine. For instance, the sphere of Inuit activity,
they observe, is not limited to the land areas of the Arctic archipelagoes but extends into
perennially ice-covered areas, thus blurring the territorial distinction between ice and
land. If Canada did not place these ice-covered areas under its land jurisdiction, they
believe, there could be broad, negative implications for Canada’s interests.40
Mei and Wang then quote article 234 of UNCLOS, which specifies regulations for icecovered areas:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone where particularly severe climatic
conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.

Mei and Wang end their analysis of Canada’s straight-baseline claims with a concession
that Canada’s interests, jurisdiction, and claims in the Arctic region are more substantive
and reasonable than those of other countries:
The stability of the ecological system in the ice-covered areas of the Arctic is without
doubt, quite fragile. Speaking from the viewpoint of the global nature of ecological protection, every country has the right and the obligation to protect the ecological environment
of the Arctic Ocean. Nonetheless, speaking from a practical level, the levels of interests and
interconnectedness of the areas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to mainland North America
are different than those of other countries. For example, the connectedness of Canada
to the environmental interests of this region are certainly stronger than those of Britain,
France, or other countries.41

Mei and Wang point out that the international community does not support Canada’s
claim to sovereignty over Arctic waters. UNCLOS’s regulations concerning ice-covered
waters are doubtless music to Canadian ears, they write, but they add that these regulations could wind up working against Canada’s interests, because gradual global climate
change might transform ice-covered areas into non-ice-covered ones. Thus, article 234
of UNCLOS may lose its meaning, they maintain.
They then argue once again that Britain, which once controlled huge segments of North
America, never hinted at British North American authority over the Arctic Ocean. Their
clear implication is that Canada inherited nothing from Britain as far as the Arctic
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Ocean is concerned and that Canada’s claims to it are its own twentieth-century contrivances. They seem genuinely appalled that in 1970 Canada followed common international practice and extended its territorial waters from three nautical miles to twelve,
thus turning the Barrow Strait into its internal waters. Canada’s designation in 1985
of the waters around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (CAA) as internal waters is also
distasteful to them, in part because it made use of the straight-baseline concept.
The two authors note with a certain alacrity that both the United States and the European Community (now the European Union) were and are strongly opposed to these
Canadian territorial waters claims and have stated so publicly.42
What Should China Do?
There is debate and difference among Chinese academics about policy recommendation
to the government. In 2009 Li Zhenfu published two virtually identical articles on interests in the Arctic in which he recommended that China play an active, preemptive, and
vigilant role in Arctic affairs.43 Linda Jakobson has already pointed out Li’s contention
that “whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world
economics and world strategies.”44 Li argues, after applying SWOT analysis, that China
should adopt a multipronged national strategy toward Arctic sea routes. First, he urges
full Chinese participation in the development of Arctic sea routes. China should do this
because of the obvious economic and strategic importance of the Arctic region, but also
because of the wealth of natural resources there: “In addition to Russia, the Arctic littoral
states Canada, the U.S., Norway, and Denmark all want to dip their cups into the rich
stew of oil and natural gas in the Arctic Ocean.” Involvement in the development of Arctic sea routes will, Li argues, be China’s entrée into other Arctic matters as well, including
the development of its natural resources. Thus, in the struggle over the Arctic “China
should, at the national level, rely on real strengths in the formulation of international
law, scientific investigations, and jurisdiction over resources and sea routes and do its utmost in the Arctic to make its own voice heard and strengthen its own right to speak up.
Only those who become owners of resources will be able to obtain their rightful value.”45
Second, Li continues, China should determine the appropriate and opportune occasions
for entering specific Arctic issues. Earlier is not necessarily always better in these matters,
he advises. Nonetheless, the time for concern about Arctic sea routes is at hand. Given
the large importance of these routes to Chinese economic development, he argues, it is
important for China to participate in issues pertaining to them right now, while there
are still no clearly defined or harmonized international mechanisms or principles for
dealing with them. In this way, when international mechanisms are formed China will
be in an advantageous position.
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Li Zhenfu makes more ambitious recommendations for the safety and convenience of
Chinese ships operating in the future in an ice-free Arctic. First, he suggests strengthened satellite monitoring of the Arctic: “The resolution of synthetic aperture radar in
monitoring and tracking sea ice has already achieved accuracy to within a few meters
and completely satisfies our needs. It is, however, relatively expensive. The precision of
geosynchronous satellite observation at high latitudes is quite low, even to the point of
unobservability.”46 If, he then points out, polar satellites (nongeosynchronous, of course)
were deployed to monitor the Northwest Passage, it would be necessary to receive data
from them in one-to-two-hour cycles. This in turn would entail deploying at least three
such satellites, perhaps more. Given the difficulties involved, he concludes, cooperating
with several other countries in satellite monitoring of the Arctic would be better than
going it alone.47
Li then proceeds to recommendations for Chinese enterprises, which he makes within
the framework of his national strategic program for opening and developing Arctic sea
routes. First, he suggests developing and improving ice-resistant, ice-breaking, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels.
Second, he urges shipping enterprises to take advantage of the present opportunity to
extend their “value chains.” Third, he encourages the development of “fourth-party
logistics” enterprises (that is, specializing in logistics, transportation, and supply-chain
management). The Arctic is poised to become a region of pivotal global significance, he
argues, and the region is a natural and practical catalyst for such operations.
Li concludes his ambitious set of recommendations with a note of urgency:
The issue of Arctic sea routes is becoming more and more important because the anticipated melting of the Arctic Ocean has accelerated. China cannot lose its right to speak up
on this issue and must struggle for the initiative in international mechanisms pertaining
to Arctic issues so that these mechanisms make accurate designations for China’s Arctic
strategy. This article has adopted analytic hierarchy process and SWOT analytical methods
in analyzing China’s Arctic sea route strategy and concludes that in facing the issue of
Arctic sea routes, China should adopt a “winning strategy” [zhengqu zhanlue], seize the
opportune moment, and actively participate in the formulation of harmonized mechanisms pertaining to Arctic sea route issues, all so that China acquires the rights and interests it deserves. My research results can help the [Chinese] government and enterprises
understand the current condition of Arctic sea route issues, formulate Arctic sea route
strategies, and come up with a practical and feasible program to aid in implementing
these recommendations.48

In another article published in 2009, Li Zhenfu starts out with observations on the
Arctic’s key importance and then delves into how China should deal with obstacles to
its participation in Arctic affairs: “The Arctic region contains rich stores of petroleum,
natural gas, mineral, and seafood resources. Approximately one fourth of the petroleum
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and natural resources untapped by humankind are in the Arctic. . . . After the Northwest
Passage is opened up it will become a new ‘axial sea route between Atlantic and Pacific,’
and the sea route between Europe, Asia, and North America will be shortened by 5,200
to 7,000 nautical miles. Whoever controls the Arctic sea routes will control the world
economy and a new internationally strategic corridor.”49
Li next outlines the practical, energy security, and world-peace significance of the Arctic
region. As far as its practical significance, he has only the jejune observation that “rights,
interests, and resources are, from beginning to end, the focus of international competition.” The United States, Russia, and Canada are scheming to take over the natural resources and strategic utility of the Arctic region for themselves, he more or less contends,
and if that situation is allowed to continue China will be reduced to the status of passive
observer in Arctic affairs. China’s lack of a developed and systematic approach to Arctic
affairs constrains its right to speak up about them and deprives the nation of its rightful
interests and international stature, which does not bode well in the long term for global
security and interests, he argues.
As for the energy security significance of the Arctic, Li’s perspective is more or less that
internationalization of the Arctic sea routes will help China avoid piracy, terrorism, and
the interruption of maritime traffic these problems can cause. Li attempts to link China’s
Arctic interests with world peace:
The vying for Arctic sea routes is becoming fiercer and fiercer, and if latent contradictions
are not quickly and appropriately dealt with, it is possible that there will be grave threats to
world peace and international security. Our country is a country that advocates peace, and
it should take active interest in the state of Arctic developments. [China should] respond
directly to transformations in the patterns of Arctic sea route rights and interests in order
to protect world security and make its rightful contributions to the sustainable development of humankind.50

Li seems to feel that increased Chinese participation in international mechanisms pertaining to Arctic affairs will somehow prevent Canada from exercising sovereignty over
the Northwest Passage. There are, according to him, three possible options for Chinese
participation in these mechanisms: hegemonic dominance, in which China requires the
formulations, alterations, and improvements of these mechanisms to conform with its
national interests; passive receptivity, in which China accepts formulations arrived at by
these mechanisms under the influence of other countries, thereby assuming the resulting
obligations and enjoying the relevant rights and interests; and active participation in said
international mechanisms, for the benefit of both China and the rights and interests of
most other countries.
Li does not consider the first option to be viable, because China “has not yet met the demands to become a leading state in international mechanisms and at present has neither
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the real power nor the strategic will to act as a leading state.”51 He dismisses the second
option summarily: “This is because most present international mechanisms have been
guided and established by a minority of great Western powers and reflect the imperatives
of their own self-interests. It would be difficult for them to avoid their existent limitations and defects. They would pose serious restrictions to China’s struggle for Arctic sea
route rights and interests.”52
This leads teleologically to his third and final option: active Chinese participation in
international mechanisms. This may or not represent Li’s ideal option, but given present
realities, it is for him obviously the only viable one:
Based on China’s present combined national power, international position, and self-interest
imperatives, choosing active participation in international mechanisms tallies best with
China’s basic national situation and practical needs. Active participation in the formulations, revisions, and improvements of international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs
is an effective avenue and the best choice for realizing China’s Arctic sea route rights and
interest imperatives, accelerating its economic and social development, bringing into play
China’s functions as a responsible major power in the international arena, and hastening
the rationalization and democratization of international relations.53

Having made this major recommendation, Li then proceeds to discuss three serious
impediments or obstacles to effective Chinese participation in these mechanisms. First
he covers the obvious advantages of the five Arctic littoral states. The A5—Canada,
Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States—are already there; in
August 2007 the Russians even placed a titanium flag of their nation at the bottom of the
Arctic Ocean. That same month Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada announced
the establishment of two new military facilities in the Arctic as indications of his nation’s
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage region and the seabed of the Arctic Ocean. These
and other actions and stances by the A5 and A8 countries will, Li argues, make it more
difficult for China to participate in Arctic affairs.
Li identifies the second major impediment as, collectively, the sector principle (the “fanshaped principle,” in Chinese parlance) and the continental shelf system. Li has special
scorn for the sector principle, which Canada first announced in 1907 and which holds
that Canadian territory and territorial waters extend in a pie-shaped (or fan-shaped)
wedge all the way to the North Pole. The Soviet Union produced a similar pattern in
1926, announcing that all land and islands within its bounds, as yet discovered or not,
were Soviet territory. Between them these Canadian and Soviet territorial claims account
for the vast majority of Arctic territory, and for this reason Li finds them particularly objectionable: “Although the sector principle has met with opposition from the other Arctic Ocean littoral states Denmark, Finland [sic], Norway, and the U.S., at a certain level it
still holds some sway. If Arctic countries insist on this principle it will undoubtedly lead
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to the opened Arctic sea routes being placed within the sovereign spheres of Arctic states,
and China will have lost its strategic position in Arctic sea routes.”54
Li turns next to the legal concept of the continental shelf, another obstacle he sees to
China’s pursuit of position and influence in the Arctic. Observing that the idea was first
brought up by the American president Harry S. Truman, he discusses the Convention
on the Continental Shelf, the incorporation of its principles within UNCLOS in 1982,
the advent of two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones, and the possible
extension of outer continental shelves beyond two hundred nautical miles by application
to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The latter development could lead to the corresponding designation of extended shelves in the Arctic,
very clearly a problem for Li, because
if the islands of the said region [the Arctic] come under clear national jurisdiction, then
the countries will have territorial sovereignty over them, and in accordance with UNCLOS
they can once again designate their territorial waters and the sea areas over which there
is national jurisdiction. . . . According to principles formed from this, the current “public
territory” [gongtu] in the Arctic will be very advantageous for the Arctic Ocean littoral
states, and particularly for Canada and Russia. In accordance with this development, the
difficulties for China’s participation in international mechanisms dealing with Arctic sea
routes would be greatly increased and would influence [China’s] obtaining of its rightful
rights and interests in Arctic sea routes.55

The third and final obstacle to Chinese participation in Arctic affairs is, as Li characterizes it, a “theoretical” one, in that current international mechanisms are based on “Western” values of freedom, equality, and democracy:
The theories of the international mechanisms the world now has were all formulated under the guidance of developed Western countries. The theoretical bases for these formulations are freedom, equality, democracy, and other such Western rational concepts [linian].
Because of this, in their fundamental nature all international mechanisms currently in
effect are, along with their theories, heavily colored by liberalism.56 There are obvious
discrepancies between the theories of international mechanisms formulated in accordance
with freedom, equality, democracy, and other Western rational concepts on the one hand
and the basic social system and mainstream ideology of China on the other. As a result,
China’s participation in international mechanisms is restrained, and this in turn has led to
China’s shortcomings in international mechanism theory and has created China’s current
failure at formulating an international mechanism theoretical system which has rigorous
logic and strong interpretive capabilities.57

Having identified these obstacles, Li recommends countermeasures for surmounting
them. With Canada clearly in mind, he strongly urges comprehensive and penetrating
examinations of the “corrupt and abusive malpractices” (biduan) inherent in the sector
principle and the continental shelf system. China should do this in order to participate
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effectively in international mechanisms dealing with Arctic affairs and thereby to avoid
losing its “right to speak up” (huayu quan).
According to Li there are three ways of attacking the sector principle. First of all, “the
‘sector principle’ is a theory based mainly on the principle of adjacency, and the common failing [tongbing] of the theory of adjacency is that it does not explore questions of
authority under the conditions of common rights and interests.” Li’s second mode of attack reduces the sector principle to a crude and illegitimate landgrab by Canada and the
Soviet Union: “The sector principle was a unilateral agreement concerning rights and
interests, one based on the unique geographical position of the Arctic. ‘Manufactured’
as it was by the governments of Canada and the former Soviet Union in order to accrue
more Arctic territory, it inevitably contains some fallacies. Further, it is not suitable for
application in regions which include territorial waters.”58
His third avenue of attack on the sector principle focuses on its lack of international
acceptance: “The sector principle has been opposed by all countries except Canada
and Russia. The United States and other countries have been especially strong in their
opposition, and this will impel the majority of countries concerned with the rights and
interests of Arctic sea routes to form an alliance of international mechanisms. This will
also weaken their [Canada’s and Russia’s] influence on China’s participation in international mechanisms dealing with Arctic sea routes.”59
Within this broad countermeasure, Li then turns his attention to continental shelf issues
and attempts to dismantle and deconstruct them by distinguishing between “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights.”60 (Interestingly enough, he does not mention China’s own
use of continental shelf arguments as part of its rationale for claiming Taiwan and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.)
Concerning the “continental shelf system,” our country should emphasize that the authority of littoral states over their continental shelves is sovereign authority [zhuquan quanli]
and not sovereignty [zhuquan]. Even though what the Arctic Ocean countries emphasize
in the Arctic region is their own sovereignty, what is produced according to the continental shelf system within the international law of the sea is sovereign authority and not
sovereignty. There is a distinction between the two.61

Another countermeasure for which Li Zhenfu argues concerns the theory underpinning
international mechanisms. China is deficient in this regard and not up to international
standards, he argues. He recommends that China diligently construct its own theoretical
system for understanding and more effectively participating in international mechanisms, which he sees as now dominated by Western views. In the construction of its
theoretical system, China should bear three things in mind. First, it should base such a
system on Chinese culture and what he calls “China’s own traditional diplomatic culture” (something this diplomatic historian finds somewhat bizarre and alarming).62 This
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new theoretical system must comport with “China’s national situation” and its struggle
for interests in the Arctic sea routes.
Second, Li strongly recommends deep and penetrating analysis of the theory of “Western” international mechanisms, especially as they pertain to the handling of Arctic sea
route issues. This would be to the benefit of China, he argues: China could then show
how scientific and reasonable its positions on Arctic affairs are. He urges his fellow
Chinese to avoid a purely doctrinal or conceptual approach, recommending instead that
China proceed from the rights, interests, and needs of all humanity in making its own
constructive contributions to rational international dialogue on Arctic issues. Sophistication in this would, Li argues, give China “theoretical prestige” and strengthen its
stature and international influence in issues concerning Arctic sea routes.
Third, Li promotes protecting and developing China’s sea power by means of UNCLOS.
The transit-passage regime affords more freedom of movement for Chinese vessels than
innocent passage, Li argues; it helps Chinese ships avoid being treated in a discriminatory manner or being impeded in their navigation, and it benefits China’s economic
development and expansion into global sea routes. UNCLOS can also be instrumental,
he argues, in securing international access to the natural resource wealth of the Arctic
Ocean’s seabed: “In accordance with the spirit of UNCLOS, sea areas under international
jurisdiction are mainly formed from the high seas and international waters, and it is
a rule that every country enjoys equal freedom on the high seas. International seabed
regions and their resources are the shared heritage and wealth of humankind.”
Li does, however, sound a note of caution about UNCLOS: if it is a “beneficial weapon”
for resolving some of China’s maritime rights and interests, it cannot be the only
weapon.63 This is because some of UNCLOS is vague and general. He argues that China
should endeavor to clear up and supplement the vague provisions of UNCLOS and also
“do its best to put an end to all pretexts and opportunities used by foreign countries to
encroach upon our country’s Arctic sea route rights and interests.”64
Li ends his article with three conclusions:
1. In actuality, the Arctic is not part of any country. But in addition to the Arctic littoral
states the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, other countries have announced
to the outside [world] that they have partial sovereignty over the Arctic. The [current
Arctic] situation resembles the scramble for sovereignty over the Antarctic in bygone
years. If this type of wrangling is not handled appropriately, it could seriously influence world security. China is a newly resurgent world-class power and also a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council. How China should assume its own
role in this [international] chess match and bring its own purposes into play is already
an obviously very important and necessary [consideration].
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2. Due to regional factors and the current system of international law, there are practical
obstacles to China’s participation in solving Arctic sea route issues. Also because of this,
our country’s obtaining of Arctic sea route rights and interests will be impeded.
3. [Natural] resources are of the utmost importance to any major power, and our country
should also exert itself in striving for the gigantic resources of the Arctic. For us, staying
aloof from [Arctic] affairs would, without a doubt, be automatic relinquishment [of our
interests in them]. Research has shown that we can punch through obstacles and actively participate in the solutions to Arctic sea route issues. Further, as a signatory state
to UNCLOS, we have the right to share in rights to the [natural] resources of the region
and to freely enter into the Arctic and other regions of the high seas. The government
of China should take active interest in the state of Arctic developments and make our
own reactions with specific regard [to them] so that we are not marginalized in this new
world hot spot region [and in this way] make our rightful contributions to the protection of world security and the sustainable development of humankind.65

In yet a further article, published in 2010, Li Zhenfu applies another fashionable theoretical approach, in this case complex networks, to China’s interests in Arctic geopolitical
issues. He ends up suggesting geopolitical tactics that have some overlap with the recommendations of his 2009 articles.
1. Protect and Develop China’s Sea Power. In present and future geopolitical issues pertaining to the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, China should, first of all, abide by relevant regulations in UNCLOS and also effectively make advantageous use of the Convention in
protecting our country’s geopolitical rights and interests in Arctic sea routes. Secondly,
we should take the new circumstances which have appeared since the Convention took
effect as turning points, adopting follow-up actions and flexible, dexterous measures,
doing our utmost to cause the Convention to be useful to us, tending toward its advantages and avoiding its disadvantages, applying practical actions to compensate for the
vague and unclear articles in the convention, and protecting at the highest limits our
country’s rights and interests pertaining to Arctic sea routes.
2. Formulate a Contingency Plan for Dealing with Crises in Geopolitical Issues. At present
China needs to engage in deep introspections and all-around considerations of its geopolitical tactics concerning Arctic sea route issues. First, we should adhere to inherent
principles and actively give impetus to international society’s establishment of frameworks and mechanisms for the common opening up and exploitation of the Arctic and
Arctic sea routes and exert ourselves to ensure the openness and fairness of Arctic and
Arctic sea route development so that the Arctic sea region brings benefit to all humankind and not [merely] individual countries and [nonstate] actors. Second, starting
now we must set our hands to preparing for responses to situations involving forcible,
out-of-control [attempts at] carving up the [Arctic] melon and Arctic sea route rights
and interests. This includes clearly expressing to international society our worries and
resolute positions in this regard, establishing a combined scientific research and crisis
response center, formulating long-term Arctic and Arctic sea route development strategies and a contingency plan for dealing with crises in the geopolitical patterns of Arctic
sea routes, increasing the strength of [China’s] involvement in scientific investigations
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and polar explorations (especially so that the possibility of our country’s open declarations of sovereignty over the Arctic and Arctic sea routes, as well as territorial claims,
cannot be eliminated), and building up an appropriate oceangoing navigational strength
as a guarantee [of our Arctic rights and interests].
3. Diligently Structure a Chinese Geopolitical Theory System for the Arctic and Arctic Sea
Routes. Of the obstacles our country faces in the fight over geopolitical rights and interests pertaining to Arctic sea routes, more are embodied by the phenomena of inconsistencies which exist between harmonized international mechanisms on the one hand and
our country’s culture and theoretical systems on the other. Accordingly, China should
actively participate in structuring Arctic sea route geopolitical international mechanisms
and also establish a Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical theory system. In establishing
a Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical theory system, we should stress holding to the
following: First, deeply researching Western geopolitical theory, drawing lessons from
its positive factors for our use and injecting new impetus and vitality into traditional
Chinese Arctic sea route geopolitical concepts; second, with a foothold in traditional
Chinese culture, starting out from our own geopolitical philosophy and geopolitical
concepts and structuring a theoretical system which tallies with China’s national situation and practical needs; and third, consciously punching through the trammels of
some customary and set ways of thinking, doing more to prove from the point of view
of theory the reasonableness and scientific nature of our own positions and stances, and
not just analyzing Arctic sea route geopolitical issues from the point of view of morals
and ethics.66

Not everyone in China concerned with Arctic affairs has been persuaded by Li Zhenfu’s
energetic recommendations and his seeming methodological and analytical rigor.
Mei Hong and Wang Zengzhen find the possibility of internationalizing Arctic waters
infinitesimally small and the resolution of the legal position of these waters fraught with
difficulties. Such major controversial issues should, they argue in their article published
in 2010, be set aside in favor of cooperation on issues on which there is some consensus
or common understanding, such as international environmental law. From there China
can, they continue, endeavor to broaden and deepen its participation in international
cooperative efforts.
In this connection Mei and Wang make three recommendations. First, China should
strive to elevate environmental protection in the Arctic to the level of international
cooperation. Nonetheless, they recognize that deepening such cooperation may be quite
difficult, given the political and ideological obstacles involved. China has much to learn
from advanced countries about environmental protection, they point out, and in the
process of international cooperation on this issue China might encounter opportunities
for more substantive political cooperation as well.
Their second recommendation is presented indirectly, as a series of pointed questions:
How many icebreakers does China have? How many Arctic expeditions has China
organized? How capable is China of organizing a complete and independent scientific
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expedition to the Arctic? (The strong implication of these questions is, of course, that
China ought to get busy building icebreakers and launching Arctic expeditions.) Chinese
scholars have a long and difficult road ahead of them, Mei and Wang maintain, if they
are to get China’s viewpoints in circulation. If China wants the right to speak up on, and
participate in, Arctic issues, the Chinese people and government need to work effectively
together, they argue.
Third, they recommend that China not press, for the time being, for a uniform Arctic
treaty, because the negotiations for it would be too difficult and obstacle ridden. They
conclude that China should instead seek to cooperate where cooperation is possible and
wait until the time is right for a uniform Arctic treaty.67
Nonetheless, the two authors adhere to the proposition that the Arctic does not belong
to any one state or group of states but is an international region and issue:
The Arctic sea areas constitute a region for the common and shared enjoyment of humankind. The entire series of activities in Arctic sea areas such as ecological protection,
environmental pollution prevention, and the development of natural resources does
not depend on the strength of one or more circum-Arctic states to be up to the task. In
consideration of the future of humankind, strengthened cooperation by every country in
Arctic sea area issues is very important. The strategy for sustainable development demands
that rational people carefully deliberate on how to open up the Arctic sea areas, and also
that they establish good legal order in the Arctic. It can be imagined that an Arctic sea area
which embodies the civilization of humankind and yet does not lose its natural characteristics will provide important development space for all humankind. In this process,
although we are not optimistic about the prospects for internationalizing the Arctic, we do
support our country’s active participation in Arctic affairs.68

Some Chinese academics writing on Arctic affairs have sought to remind their countrymen and government of the uncertainties and perils of the region’s sea routes. Their
sobering observations about the viability of directing extensive shipping through them
might explain in part the restraint Beijing has thus far displayed in its policy on Arctic
affairs:
Chinese Arctic specialists acknowledge the same uncertainties as many of their Western
counterparts when contemplating how lucrative the Arctic [sea] routes would ultimately
be in comparison to the current routes through the Suez and Panama canals. Although
passage along the Northern Sea Route from eastern China to Western Europe would
substantially shorten the journey, high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure and
harsh conditions may make the Arctic [sea] routes commercially unviable, at least in the
short term. Drift ice will continue to be a problem for ships even when the Arctic passages
are officially deemed ice-free. Because of the melting of Greenland’s ice cap, the number of
icebergs is expected to increase, forcing ships to proceed at a slow speed and make detours.
Furthermore, the shallow depth of some of the passages along the shipping routes (in
particular the Bering Strait) makes the Arctic unsuited for big cargo ships.69
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It is noteworthy that Canadian geographer Frédéric Lasserre has made similar observations: “The Northwest Passage is not a deepwater passage: larger tankers and carriers will
not be able to use it, at least not if they are loaded with cargo, unless they use McClure
Strait, which only recently (2007) saw the ice disappear for a very short period of time.”70
Nonetheless, estimates and predictions of the first occurrence of ice-free summer seasons for the Arctic vary widely, ranging from as early as 2013 to as late as 2060. According to U.S. Navy rear admiral David Titley, “We believe that sometime between 2035 and
2040, there is a pretty good chance that the Arctic Ocean will be essentially ice-free for
about a month.”71
The Arctic and Antarctica: Poles Apart?
Could a model, analogue, or precedent for resolving claims to the Arctic and preventing
war in the region be found in the suspension of competing claims of sovereignty over
Antarctica with the Antarctic Treaty System of 1959? Li Zhenfu notes in passing that the
current struggle over the Arctic bears some resemblance to the former struggle over the
Antarctic;72 Jia Yu of the China Institute for Marine Affairs in Beijing suggests that the
settlement of the Antarctic issue might be of use in current Arctic disputes: “The ‘Antarctic Treaty’ system froze the claims of relevant countries to territorial sovereignty over
mainland Antarctica and guaranteed the ‘deep slumber’ of the continent of Antarctica
for many decades. Could a more concrete treaty for the Arctic also be formulated, one
that would cause the opening up and exploitation of the Arctic region to benefit all
humankind?”73
But in China the consensus among in-depth considerations of the Antarctic model
seems to be that it is inapplicable to the Arctic situation. For example, in an article
published in 2009, Dong Yue of the Ocean University of China expresses doubt that the
Antarctic Treaty could ever be a model or precedent for a corresponding Arctic Treaty
and argues that the framework for the international law of the sea is a more hopeful
prospect for resolving Arctic disputes. Dong’s reasons are, first, the foundational factors
of the Antarctic legal system differ greatly from those of the Arctic, the Arctic being not
a solitary continent but a region in which eight states exist; second, the sovereignty of
Arctic states in the Arctic cannot be frozen, and development in the Arctic has already
been a historical reality for some time; and third, there are basic differences between
the Svalbard or Spitsbergen Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty, with the former affirming Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands but the latter freezing all claims of
sovereignty over the Arctic.74 Dong also points out that the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008
indicates this impossibility:
In summation of the above, establishing in the Arctic a uniform treaty system similar to
the Antarctic Treaty, thereby setting aside disputes and engaging in joint development, is
not feasible. The actions of Arctic countries are proof of this article’s viewpoints. The five
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Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) stated in
the Ilulissat Declaration that “this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible
management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop
a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.” This point
shows that the A5 states already uniformly reject the possibility of accepting the conclusion
of a new Antarctic-style uniform treaty.75

Dong’s hope and contention is that the current international law of the sea, not an ideal
treaty modeled after the Antarctic Treaty out there somewhere on the Platonic plane, can
serve as the basis for future resolutions to current Arctic disputes and that China will
have some input in this process:
So where, after all, is the path for resolving Arctic legal disputes? The declaration of the five
states gives the answer just the same, and that is in making full use of the current systematic framework of the international law of the sea. In actuality, up until the present the
relevant stances of the Arctic littoral countries toward outer continental shelves have not
broken through the system of regulations established in UNCLOS. Further, the relevant
countries also recognize that the [UN’s] Continental Shelf Commission has decision-making
authority [sic] toward their stances. The current influence of our country in Arctic legal affairs is, for the most part, not large and is still stuck in the corner of scientific research. But
proceeding from our country’s strategic rights and interests, our country can, on the basis
of issues pertaining to the extension of continental shelves and the harmonization of our
relevant stances toward outer continental shelves, pay close attention at the highest levels
to the applications [to the Continental Shelf Commission] of Arctic countries for their
continental shelves. [We can] emphasize the international position of the Arctic region’s
seabed areas and high seas, expand the space of the Arctic as global public territory, and
leave behind space for the future search for rights and interests in the Arctic.76

Mei and Wang doubt very much the utility of the Antarctic model, and they cite, in order to dispute, Chinese scholars who think otherwise. Any analogy between the Antarctic
and the Arctic in international terms is, they argue, inappropriate:
First, the isolation of Antarctica determined that Antarctic international isolation would
not exert substantial influence on the strategic rights and interests of each state involved.
The Arctic, however, is quite different. The internationalization of the Arctic will certainly
be hugely influential on the strategic rights and interests of the Arctic states.* Russia and
Canada especially will not tolerate the internationalization of the Arctic.
Second, taking note of the background that led to the “Antarctic Treaty,” it is not difficult
to see that although some countries discovered mainland Antarctica very early on, they
were still unable to carry out effective opening up of mainland Antarctica due to their
levels of technological development at the time. That is to say, none of these countries obtained substantial rights and interests in Antarctica, and this made the internationalization
of Antarctica become a possibility. Let us ask: If the United States, England, France, and
others had carried out large-scale opening up of Antarctica at the time, could Antarctica
* Beiji zhoubian guojia here refers, I think, to the A8 and not just the five Arctic littoral states.—Trans.
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still have been internationalized? Look again at the Arctic region, where Russia, the United
States, Canada, and other powerful maritime states struck first and gained the upper hand,
getting an early start in research on topics relating to the Arctic (including research on
the legal position of the Arctic and research on Arctic natural science). They have already
realized, or in the not-too-distant future will realize, their rights and interests in the Arctic
region. Against this background, will they forsake these rights and interests and make
concessions?
Third, the positions of the circum-Arctic states in the Arctic are, in reality, unequal. For
example, Russia has an absolute advantage in the numbers of ice-breaking vessels, and
from Russia’s “flag-planting incident” can be seen the overbearing manner of this big
northern lunk. The minority circum-Arctic countries have difficulties [even] in reaching common understandings [heyi], to say nothing of drawing up an international Arctic
treaty.77

Liu and Yang give four reasons for their similar pessimism. First, Antarctica is a continent and the only piece of land in the world without a sovereign, whereas in the Arctic
there are several states with territorial sovereignty, exclusive economic zones, and
continental shelves; second, article 234 of UNCLOS already addresses ice-covered sea
areas, and UNCLOS is widely applied in the Arctic region; third, many bilateral and
multilateral agreements pertaining to the Arctic have already been concluded under the
influence of UNCLOS, including AEPS; and fourth, the Antarctic is a nonmilitarized
region, whereas nuclear weapons are present in the Arctic, the most militarized region in
the world.78
It is worth noting that reservations by individual Chinese analysts about the analogical
applicability of the Antarctic Treaty to current Arctic affairs dovetail with U.S. foreign
policy on the issue: “The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the Antarctic region such that an ‘Arctic Treaty’ of broad scope—along
the lines of the Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.”79

The Arctic in China’s Popular Media
Coverage of Arctic issues is not limited to academic venues in China, and the subject is
gradually attracting attention in China’s mass media. A significant amount of the publicmedia commentary and reporting on military affairs in recent years has been by the eloquent and telegenic Shao Yongling, a female tutor to doctoral students and holder of the
military rank of senior colonel at China’s Second Artillery Academy. Shao has regularly
appeared in programs on CCTV 7, a television channel in China’s state-controlled media
empire, and is currently a distinguished guest speaker on the weekend program Around
the World’s Military Affairs in Sixty Minutes. Shao published a popular book in March
2010 on the relationship between naval might and the rise of great powers, and in it is a
chapter entitled “Whose Arctic Is It?”80
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In Dili jiaoyu (Geographical Education), a periodical largely for middle-school educators,
a high school teacher in Jiangsu Province wrote in 2009 on global warming and its influence on the hydrology and biology of the Arctic, in an article that turned to an analysis
of its global social and economic impacts.81
The Finnish scholar Linda Jakobson’s landmark 2010 study of China’s interests in the
Arctic and its preparations for an ice-free Arctic region has led to some commentary and
discussion in popular Chinese media, as in the 2 March 2010 edition of Fazhi wanbao,
which presented a straightforward account of Jakobson’s observations and conclusions.82
But another article, published on 6 March, was critical of Jakobson’s study, characterizing it as speculative in nature and alleging that it failed to provide evidence for its
contentions.83
The November 2010 issue of Dangdai haijun contains four articles on the Arctic—an
overview of international angling for territorial position in the Arctic and three fulminations against, respectively, Russia for its flag-planting “incident” on the bottom of the
Arctic Sea, the United States for playing the environmental card as a ploy for achieving
hegemony over the Arctic, and Canada for regarding the Arctic as its “backyard.”84

The Chinese Government Speaks—a Little
Although China’s Arctic policy is currently being debated and is not yet fully formulated,
some of its contours are emerging fairly clearly. First and foremost, it is already obvious
that China views the Arctic as international territory and not the private property or
exclusive preserve of the A5 or A8. Beyond that, the Chinese government seems, in open
speeches and publications at least, to be making rather optimistic noises and gestures as
to future amicable resolution of present Arctic disputes.
In 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, gave an address on
the Chinese government’s perspectives at an Arctic forum in Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago. He started out by depicting the Arctic as a global concern: “The Arctic occupies
a unique position for all of us as humankind who live on the blue planet. The changing
natural environment in the Arctic is enormously influential toward the existence and
environment of all humankind. The Arctic is a sensitive region in global climate change.
The entire planet in turn reacts to natural changes in the Arctic, especially the climate of
the northern hemisphere.”85
From here Hu segued into a characterization of China as a country in the northern
hemisphere and therefore a rightful participant in Arctic affairs:
China is a northern hemisphere country, and changes in the cold air activity of the Arctic
region and the atmospheric circulation of high-latitude climes have direct influences on
China’s weather and climate and obvious effects on China’s ecological and environmental
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systems and its agricultural production and other social and economic activities. The
melting of Arctic ice quickly raises global sea levels and influences the economic and social
development of China’s eastern coastal regions. Arctic matters do, therefore, have multiple
bearings on China’s natural environment, economy, and society. They influence the
sustainability of China’s development. The government of China is, therefore, greatly concerned about them. China needs to understand more about climate change in the Arctic
and more about the influence of this type of change on China. (p. 54)

Hu then went on to describe China’s recent scientific activities in the Arctic—their
beginning in the mid-1990s, China’s formal joining of the International Arctic Science
Committee in 1996, and three combined Arctic Ocean investigations, in 1999, 2003, and
2008. In 2004, he noted, China established the Arctic Yellow River Station in the Arctic
(in fact, on Spitsbergen Island) for scientific research into climate change and ecological
and maritime subjects. That China has already become a significant player in the Arctic
game was his strong implication.
Having China’s own current contentious issues of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in mind, Hu was careful to indicate that China would show respect for
these concerns in the Arctic:
China takes note of the exclusive economic zones and outer continental shelves of relevant
countries in the Arctic region, especially since the extended continental shelves have yet to
be designated. China considers that the undetermined nature of the legal position of the
maritime areas of the Arctic region might influence the further development of cooperation in the Arctic and hopes that relevant countries will, through consultation and on the
basis of international law and scientific data, come to an early resolution of relevant issues.
(p. 55)

Hu’s comments to this point amount to little more than standard diplomatic bureaucrat
ese, but now he adds a broad hint that Arctic countries should not attempt to lock up for
themselves the natural resource wealth of the Arctic:
While determining the demarcations of extended continental shelves, the countries of the
Arctic region should, in addition to appropriately handling relations among themselves,
give full and careful consideration to the relationship between extended continental
shelves and international seabed areas which are the shared inherited wealth of all humankind. Arctic countries should protect the balance between the interests of states with shorelines on the Arctic Ocean and the shared interests of the international community. (p. 55)

Nonetheless, Hu recognizes the Arctic issue as mainly a regional issue, apparently
contradicting Guo Peiqing’s earlier insistence in 2008 that “circumpolar nations have to
understand that Arctic affairs are not only regional issues but also international ones.”86
Hu does observe, however, that China prefers a cooperative international approach to
the Arctic whenever possible:
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The Arctic issue is mainly a regional issue, but it also involves climate change, shipping,
and other trans-regional issues that require strengthened cooperation at regional and
international levels. China is very happy to observe that over the past 20 years, Arctic
cooperation has continually deepened, broadened, and is becoming more mechanized
with each passing day. Cooperation is now the mainstream of Arctic affairs, and China
respects the sovereignty and jurisdictional authority enjoyed by states in the Arctic region
in accordance with international law. China is willing to strengthen mutually beneficial
cooperation with all parties involved in relevant Arctic issues and work diligently for the
peace, stability, and sustainable development of the Arctic region.87

It is noteworthy that Hu did not comment on the issue of Canadian sovereignty over
the Northwest Passage. Frédéric Lasserre observes that Beijing has officially remained
silent regarding Canada’s position that the passage is internal Canadian waters: “China
has not publicly stated its position concerning the status of the Northwest Passage, but it
would certainly be interested in securing a mechanism that could provide for a safe and
fast passage to its energy-hungry markets. That does not mean it will seek to undermine
Canada’s stance on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage; Beijing has remained neutral
on the sovereignty issue.”88
In a 2010 article, Jia Yu, of the State Oceanic Administration (Guojia Haiyangju), gives a
fairly detailed historical overview of Arctic territorial issues all the way back to the Tzar
Alexander I’s declaration of sovereignty over parts of North America in 1821.89 He even
briefly covers the outstanding issue between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island.
His purpose in all of this, never explicitly stated, seems to be to show that many issues
pertaining to territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves have
been debated and resolved in the past and that remaining issues will likely be resolved
in the future: “Of the disputes over maritime boundaries in the Arctic region, some have
been successfully resolved; some are still being debated, and some have been alleviated
through joint development, fishery agreements, and other such ways.”90
Jia covers the 1957 agreement on the maritime boundary between Norway and the
Soviet Union in the Varangerfjorden (the coastal region of the land boundary between
Norway and the Soviet Union) in the Barents Sea; the agreement on the continental
shelf boundary between Canada and Greenland in 1981 and 1982; the 1990 treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the maritime boundary between the
Chukchi Sea (north of the Bering Sea) and the Bering Sea; the 1993 decision of the ICJ
regarding the designation of the continental shelf and fishery area boundaries between
Norway and Denmark and the subsequent Danish-Norwegian treaty in 1995; and the
agreement between Norway and Russia in 2007 on the continental shelf. He also covers
the outstanding dispute between Canada and the United States over the Beaufort Sea
maritime boundary. (At stake in this dispute are over six thousand square nautical miles
of sea area above rich oil and natural-gas resources.) He concludes with the observation
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that there remain outstanding disputes between Iceland and Denmark over maritime
boundaries between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands and between Norway’s Svalbard
Islands and Greenland.91
Next Jia covers the thorny issue of outer continental shelves extending beyond two
hundred nautical miles and looks at current applications by Norway, Russia, Canada,
and Denmark to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to secure
these extensions for themselves. He points out that the United States, which has yet to
accede to UNCLOS, has “criticized” these applications.92 He then drops a broad and subtly optimistic hint that the Svalbard Treaty (which China joined in 1925) and UNCLOS
will provide precedents and momentum for the eventual resolution of other current or
incipient Arctic issues:
The main body of the Arctic region is the Arctic Ocean. Intimately related to this special
geographical feature [is the fact that] dispositions of territorial sovereignty in the Arctic
region have gone through several previous changes and have long since been relegated to
the dust. UNCLOS affirmed Norway’s territorial sovereignty over Svalbard Islands, thereby
resolving the disposition of sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands as well as guaranteeing
their relative long-term stability. Even so, Norway’s “full and complete sovereignty” over
the Svalbard Islands is restrained by the vessels and citizens of each signatory state in the
Svalbard Islands and by their fishing and hunting rights in internal waters. This causes
Norway’s sovereignty over the Svalbard Islands to differ to some extent from the paramount completeness of territorial sovereignty enjoyed by states in traditional international
law. Articles of the Svalbard Treaty are now facing issues of integration with the modern
legal system established by UNCLOS. At present only Canada and Denmark are standing
their ground over Hans Island. At this same time, especially since the 1980s of the twentieth century, relevant countries have concluded and signed maritime boundary treaties
and have resolved, or are in the process of resolving, issues pertaining to the boundaries of
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.93

Jia here quite likely means to suggest or hint that the Svalbard Treaty could be used as
a model, precedent, or analogue for defining Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage. This idea has been noted and dismissed as impossible in an article published in
Canada.94
Jia next concludes his article with two paragraphs setting out his opinion (and very
likely the Chinese government’s as well) that the Arctic, beyond the extended continental
shelves of the A5, belongs to the world:
One of the obvious peculiarities of the disputes over sea area boundary delimitation in
the Arctic region is the inclusion among them of issues pertaining to continental shelves
beyond two hundred nautical miles. This forms unique “boundary limits” between the
national jurisdictional sea areas of littoral states on the one hand and international seabed
regions (“regions”) on the other. According to UNCLOS, “regions” and their resources
beyond the limits of the outer continental shelves of littoral states are the commonly
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inherited wealth of humankind, and the International Seabed Authority exercises, on
behalf of all humankind, the rights to the “regions” and their resources. The two-hundrednautical-mile outer continental shelves of littoral states on the one hand and the “regions”
on the other are a zero-sum game—the tendency of excessively extending the continental
shelves of littoral states is certainly to shrink the scope of the “regions,” thereby influencing the rights and interests of all humankind. Whether and how much of the seabed of
the Arctic Ocean belongs to the continental shelves of littoral states [are questions that]
await the deliberations and recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf in response to Russian and Norwegian boundary submissions and future
boundary limitation cases brought by other circum-Arctic countries.
The “Antarctic Treaty” system froze the claims of relevant countries to territorial sovereignty over mainland Antarctica and guaranteed the “deep slumber” of the continent of
Antarctica for many decades. Could a more concrete treaty for the Arctic also be formulated, one which would cause the opening up and exploitation of the Arctic region to benefit
all humankind? Whether this kind of treaty can be produced or not, there is one point
that needs to be clear and definite: The Arctic Ocean is not the backyard of any country or
group of countries and is not the “private property” of the Arctic Ocean littoral states. As
with Earth’s other oceans, under the framework of international law, every country in the
world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean.95

Caution—for the Time Being
American policy makers should be aware that China’s recent interest in Arctic affairs
is not an evanescent fancy or a passing political fad but a serious, new, incipient policy
direction. China is taking concrete diplomatic steps to ensure that it becomes a player
in the Arctic game and eventually will have what it regards as its fair share of access
to Arctic resources and sea routes. China has already committed substantial human,
institutional, and naval resources to its Arctic interests and will continue to do so, likely
at an accelerated rate, in the future. The Polar Research Institute of China (Zhongguo
Jidi Yanjiu Zhongxin), with a staff of 124 people headquartered in Shanghai, supervises
three Chinese research stations in the Antarctic and one in the Arctic. It also manages
the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon), a light, Ukraine-built, nonnuclear vessel
with a displacement of twenty-one thousand tons, used in both Arctic and Antarctic
scientific expeditions.96 Xuelong, the largest conventionally powered icebreaker in the
world, reached eighty-eight degrees north latitude in August 2010, and its helicopter
took Chinese Arctic researchers to the North Pole on 20 August 2010, a Chinese first.
The Arctic and Antarctic Administration (Guojia Haiyangju Jidi Kaocha Bangongshi),
under the State Oceanic Administration, also manages Chinese scientific research activity in the Arctic.97 China currently plans to build its own smaller (eight thousand tons
displacement) sister icebreaker to Xuelong, at a cost of U.S.$300 million, and to have it
operational by 2013. “Between the two ships,” the New York Times observed in May 2010,
“China will have larger and more modern icebreakers than either the United States or
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Canada.”98 Russia, for its part, has over a dozen heavy icebreakers, seven of them nuclear
powered.
The United States should, of course, make heavy icebreakers a national defense priority.
Many Americans would be shocked to learn that both of their country’s heavy icebreakers designed for use in the thickest ice are decrepit, decades-old vessels and are at this
writing broken down or otherwise unavailable. One, Polar Star, is in dry dock in Seattle
for an overhaul and will not be operational again until 2013. The other, Polar Sea, is out
of service and, at this writing, will not be seaworthy again until sometime in 2011. (Polar
Sea was commissioned in 1978 with a projected thirty-year service life; an overhaul in
2006 extended its service life to 2014.)99 There is a third icebreaker, USCGC Healy, but
it is not designed for heavy ice. The New York Times bemoaned the resultant state of
American Arctic defenses on 25 June 2010 in stark terms:
Even as the long-term trend in the Arctic is toward less sea ice in summers, for decades to
come—and routinely in other seasons—any nation with interests in the far north will need
to be able to navigate in heavy ice.
Until Congress and the White House come up with a plan to round up about $1.5 billion
to keep the Polar Sea and Polar Star running, and another $1 billion or so to build replacements, the United States is an Arctic nation without that capacity.100

How can the U.S. Coast Guard guard the Arctic coasts of the United States without the
required vessels? Icebreakers are not Cold War relics but essential components of Arctic
security. The need to repair and make more of them is pressing and real, now, and it will
be in the future.
For its part, China is working discreetly and energetically to foster good relations with
Arctic states. Beijing is currently quite annoyed at Norway for awarding Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize on 8 October 2010 and is making noises about
damage to Sino-Norwegian relations. Already China has canceled some official contacts
between the two countries. But given China’s heavy reliance on Norway in its maneuvering for advantage in the Arctic region, it is quite unlikely that any damage will be
substantial or enduring. Russia Today reported on 5 October 2010 that the two states
very much need each other:
Back in August this year, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre praised China’s
cooperation in the Arctic and said it should go farther in the future. Speaking at the
China Institute of International Studies Forum in Beijing, he said that Oslo had observed
“China’s technological interest and capability in the Arctic.”
“We would like to see how Norwegian and Chinese research groups on the environment
come together in highly complementary areas of interest and go deeper, in areas ranging from natural science to geopolitics,” he said, cited Beijing Review. “It is important for
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Norway to engage with China in dialogue about all issues relevant in the region,” Støre
added.101

China is also cultivating close relationships with Iceland:
Meanwhile, Beijing is also actively strengthening ties with another player in the region—
Iceland. The area of particular interest for China is new sea routes which are opening
due to ice melting. Citing Icelandic President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson[’s] interview with
Norwegian broadcaster NRK, Barents Observer wrote that over the past two years relations
between Iceland and China have picked up pace.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, when the banks collapsed in Iceland, “we faced a situation, where there was no positive helping hand coming either from Europe or the United
States, and I and the government decided to approach the government of China . . . to
see if China could show some friendship in these times of difficulties,” Grímsson said. He
added that the bilateral talks between the leaderships of the two countries indicated that
China is keen “to cooperate with Iceland and the other countries in the Arctic region on
what is happening in the Arctic and the northern regions and also of what are the implications of the northern sea routes opening up over the next few decades,” the president is
quoted as telling NRK.102

“China can be expected to seek a role in determining the political framework and legal
foundation for future Arctic activities,” Linda Jakobson noted in early 2010.103 It seems
that China respects, in principle, the UN’s continental shelf system. But China very
much wants a voice in Arctic affairs, and it will likely seek to influence, or at least comment emphatically upon, the decision-making processes and deliberations of the UN’s
Continental Shelf Commission. While there is likely little, as a practical matter, that
China could do to influence the decisions of the commission, in the future China will
monitor very closely the extended-continental-shelf claims of A5 countries, will likely
express its opinions about them, and may even dispute some of them. Some Chinese
academics see the stakes for China in all of this as huge: “Guo [Peiqing] has estimated
that about 88 percent of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean would be under the control of
the Arctic littoral states if the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf were
to approve all the existing or expected claims to the Arctic Ocean continental shelf.”104
A Russo-Chinese entente concerning Arctic affairs seems unlikely. China is particularly
wary of Russia’s designs and intentions in the Arctic, and the feeling would seem to be
mutual.105 In fact, China seems to be more at odds with Russia over Arctic affairs than
with any other A5 or A8 state. There could, however, be cooperation among East Asian
states regarding the Arctic issue.106
The Svalbard Treaty affirms “the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the
Archipelago of Spitsbergen” but qualifies this sovereignty to some extent by stipulating
the rights of the nationals of all signatory states to “equal liberty of access and entry for
any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords, and ports” of the islands. The treaty
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further restricts Norway from militarizing the archipelago.107 It was on the basis of the
provisions of this treaty that China managed in 2004 to establish a physical presence in
the Arctic by constructing its Arctic Yellow River Station (Huanghe Zhan) in the Svalbard Archipelago/Spitsbergen (in the Barents Sea, well inside the Arctic Circle), a facility
for oceanic and climatological research. China became the eighth state to establish research facilities there. Some (but certainly not all) Chinese academics and governmental
officials who comment on Arctic affairs have indirectly and tentatively floated (or at least
broadly hinted at) the possibility of using the Svalbard Treaty as a model or precedent
for resolving Canada’s claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters. Their suggestion seems more or less to be that Canada might be allowed
Svalbard-like “full and absolute sovereignty” over the passage but with the proviso that
international shipping be allowed passage through it with something like “equal liberty
of access and entry for any reason or object whatever.” But this of course would be quite
unpalatable to Canada, and it seems naive to assume or hope that the Canadian government and public would ever accept it.
The United States should neither underestimate China’s burgeoning interests in the
Arctic region nor allow itself to be outdone by China. The Chinese have become acute
observers of the region. According Dr. Robert Huebert, an internationally renowned
Canadian expert on the Arctic at the University of Calgary, China has shown itself to be
a quick study in Arctic affairs and has been doing a lot of very good homework on the
region.108 The government of the United States should pay close attention to China’s
engagement in Arctic affairs and consider its possible security implications, especially
since the U.S. Navy in late 2009 observed that increasing economic and scientific activities in the Arctic are “potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural
resources.”109
The United States and its allies should be prepared for possible Chinese submarine
incursions into the Arctic. A study published in Beijing in 2002 by Military Science
applies Sunzi to submarine warfare and points out the value of the submarine in hightech intelligence gathering and surveillance: “In the modern technology and information
age, the marvelous way [dao] of employing spies in waging submarine warfare is indeed
the application of high new technology.”110 China has placed strong new emphasis on
strengthening and updating its submarine fleet, and its submarines have recently stalked
American naval vessels. Given this trend and also the brazen violation of Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese submarine in 2004, it should not be too surprising in the
future to find or detect one or more Chinese submarines lurking in the cold and murky
depths of the Arctic, perhaps even in the territorial Arctic waters of the United States or
Canada.111 In Cold War history there is much precedent for Soviet and American peacetime submarine operations and maneuvers in the Arctic.112
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It is, however, also important not to overestimate the importance of the Arctic in most
publicly available Chinese naval strategic thinking. Two important books by major Chinese naval strategists published in 2010 discuss little if anything substantive regarding
Chinese interests in the Arctic, but they cover the Indian Ocean quite extensively.113 One
recent book on Chinese seapower does, however, have the insight and foresight to devote
significant coverage to Arctic and Antarctic affairs.114
The United States should accede to UNCLOS. This would be difficult currently, because
a small but obstreperous group of senators is holding up accession, a regrettable and unfortunate situation since the United States can ill afford to be marginalized or hampered
and hobbled in Arctic affairs while other A5 states busily prepare extended-continentalshelf territorial claims. These senators should rethink their positions in light of China’s
recent and developing engagement in Arctic affairs and note that at least two Chinese
commentators have concluded that continual American nonaccession will be detrimental to U.S. interests.115
As well, an American naval analyst has recently observed that “the failure of the United
States to accede to UNCLOS gives China unchallenged diplomatic space to attempt to
shape law of the sea in its favor.”116
Ironically, the United States is currently preparing its own extended-continental-shelf
claims in the Arctic even though it is not party to UNCLOS, which provides the mechanism for submitting such claims. American legal rationale and liabilities pertaining to this
are published on the Extended Continental Shelf Project website of the U.S. government:
The United States is the only Arctic country, and indeed one of the few countries in
the world, that has not yet ratified the LOS Convention. A non-party country has the
same rights in its extended continental shelf as a country that has ratified the Convention, but without ratifying, the U.S. cannot submit its scientific findings to the CLCS,
which means the U.S. will not have the opportunity to receive their recommendations
and set ECS [extended continental shelf] limits based on them. There is an [sic] benefit
to considering these recommendations: according to the LOS Convention, if a coastal
country establishes its ECS limits “on the basis of” CLCS recommendations, those limits
are “final and binding.”117

Accession to UNCLOS is the common recommendation of both the former George W.
Bush and current Barack Obama administrations and is supported by a strong alliance
of American military, environmental, shipping, energy, and other interests. In its recently
issued “U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap,” the U.S. Navy itself urges UNCLOS accession.118 Nowhere is the rationale for accession better spelled out than in the most recent statement
of American Arctic policy, issued during the final days of the Bush administration:
The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the
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Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over
extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession
will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it will give the
United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated
and interpreted.119

As for Beijing, it is somewhat difficult to read or predict all of its intentions and policy
designs regarding the Arctic. Some observers view China’s rapidly developing interest
in the Arctic with concern and even alarm, while others are less certain that Chinese
engagement in Arctic affairs has ominous implications. Lasserre, for instance, takes a
relatively benign view of China’s growing wealth and power in general and of its Arctic
interests in particular.120 He even sees cooperation with China and engagement of the
country within the Arctic Council as a possible way to advance Canadian interests in
the Arctic.121 It might also be a means to counter American intransigence regarding the
Northwest Passage: “The Canadian government, confronted with the Americans’ refusal
to recognize its claim of sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage, could engage China as well as other countries in discussing the need to implement tight shipping
rules in the Arctic.”122 He also regards China’s Arctic interests as more an opportunity
than a danger for Canada;123 Jakobson takes the same view with regard to “the Nordic
countries that otherwise struggle to be noticed by the rising great power that is preoccupied by global challenges.”124
China has stated that it “takes note” of the EEZs and outer continental shelves of A5
countries, but these statements are of course somewhat qualified and ambiguous; China
has also indicated its hopes that the A5 states will balance their own economic interests with those of the international community (meaning primarily China). But even
if these statements are taken at face value, they are still largely unclear, because they do
not preclude the possibility of Beijing’s aversion to the future submission of extendedcontinental-shelf claims by the five Arctic littoral states.
But expressing displeasure at A5 extended-continental-shelf claims in the Arctic could
be a delicate and difficult matter for Beijing in view of its own such claims in the East
China Sea and the South China Sea.125 While the South China Sea is a core interest to
China and the Arctic is not, Beijing nonetheless knows it is faced with a thorny diplomatic quandary in the latter and is currently thinking through the tortuous diplomatic
contortions and inconsistent, selective logic that its engagement in Arctic affairs may
entail in the future. China seems to apply very different approaches to territoriality in
the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Even though “only a few of the South China
Sea’s islands qualify under UNCLOS for more than a mere 12–nautical mile territorial
sea” and “only a small handful of all the islands in the South China Sea qualify for an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf,” China has now “essentially claimed the
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South China Sea as its own,” based largely on its own domestically legislated claims and
on self-perceived strategic imperatives.126 China would, however, almost certainly find
distasteful A5 states doing essentially the same things in the Arctic region. Thus, Beijing
finds itself on the horns of a dilemma in terms of the consistency of its South China Sea
policy and its incipient Arctic policy, and Washington seems to have clued in on this.
Since “international law prevents a state from claiming legal rights if it objects to the
same type of claims by other states,” it may well be that Washington is subtly tolerating or even encouraging greater Chinese enthusiasm for the commons approach to the
Arctic, if only to lessen China’s potentially more assertive approaches to maritime claims
in its own region.127
The U.S. Navy itself has acknowledged that “while the Arctic is not unfamiliar to the
Navy, expanded capabilities and capacity may be required for the Navy to increase its
engagement in this region.”128 The American navy is committed to “strengthen[ing]
institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations”;129 it has “broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”;130 finally,
it wants to “promote a safe, stable, and secure Arctic region by strengthening existing
and fostering new cooperative relationships.”131
Prudence and realism dictate that foreign policy plan and hope for the best but prepare
for the worst. China is quite aware that its “size and rise to power status evoke jitters,”
and according to Linda Jakobson, Beijing has decided, for the time being at least, to
“advocate cautious Arctic policies for fear of causing alarm and provoking countermeasures among the Arctic states.”132 But this reticence and restraint on China’s part will not
likely last indefinitely. China is very heavily dependent on international shipping (energy
imports and finished goods exports) for its economic, social, and political stability;133 if
and when the Arctic proves to be truly valuable for its natural resources and sea routes,
Beijing will likely become much more assertive. The United States should be prepared
for the possibility that Beijing could someday conclude that developments or situations
in the Arctic threaten China’s economic prosperity, and thus Chinese social stability and
ultimately the political power of the Communist Party of China. At a minimum it is in
the interest of the United States and the other A5 NATO democracies to maintain defensive capabilities for safeguarding the security of the Arctic region.
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Abbreviations and Definitions

A

A5
		

C

E
I
L
M

A8

Arctic Five plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden

AEPS

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

AMAP

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program

CAA

Canadian Arctic Archipelago

CAFF

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna

CCTV

China Central Television

CLC

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution

CLCS

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

CPC

Communist Party of China

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

EPPR

energy prevention, preparedness, and response

ICJ

International Court of Justice

LNG

liquefied natural gas

LOS

law of the sea

MARPOL

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships

		

P
S
U

Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United
States)

PAME

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment

SWOT

strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Chinese Glossary

B

Baguo Lianjun		八国联军
Beiji zhoubian guojia

北极周边国家

biduan		
弊端

C
D
G

chashou		
插手
dao		
道
gongtu		
公土
Guojia Haiyangju 		

国家海洋局

Guojia Haiyangju Jidi
Kaocha Bangongshi

H

heyi

		

		

国家海洋局极地考察办公室
合意

Huanghe Zhan 		黄河站

J
L
T
X
Z

huayu quan		

话语权

Jidi baguo lianmeng 		

极地八国联盟

linian		
理念
tongbing		
通病
Xuelong 		
雪龙
zhengqu zhanlue 		

争取战略

Zhongguo Jidi Yanjiu
Zhongxin 		
中国极地研究中心
zhuquan		 主权
zhuquan quanli 		

主权权利
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